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Abstract 
Little is known about the price impact and timing of actual share repur-
chases. Data unavailability has hindered research in most countries, includ-
ing the United States. Using unique data on actual share repurchase trans-
actions from Norway, we test for the price impact and timing of daily open 
market repurchases. We find evidence that share repurchases typically follow 
after a negative drift in the stock price, and the average three-day abnormal 
return around the announcement is 0.54%. Moreover, the initial market re-
action is greater for repurchases that are pursued by small firms and for 
firms that experience a negative drift in the stock price prior to the trans-
action. The evidence presented is seemingly indicative of managers’ intent 
to signal undervaluation through repurchase transactions. However, we do 
not find any significant long-term abnormal returns for repurchasing firms. 
This result suggests that on average, managers do not time the market based 
on informational advantage. 
 
Keywords: Share repurchases motives, price impact, long-term, timing, sig-
naling, undervaluation, open market repurchases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Throughout this paper, the term “repurchase transaction” is used to refer to the 
announcement of a repurchase transaction, and the term “repurchase program” is used to 
refer to the announcement of a repurchase program.   
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1   1 Introduction 
 
1 Introduction 
The relaxation of repurchase regulations across a host of countries has led 
to a dramatic rise in global repurchase activity over the past two decades. 
Share repurchases are now recognized as a global phenomenon and represent 
a major constituent of corporate payout policy. The growing popularity has 
sparked great academic interest, which persists to this day. Previous studies 
find a positive stock price reaction both to announcements of repurchase 
programs and to repurchase transactions. 1 This price reaction is explained 
by various hypotheses, including the signaling of undervaluation, agency 
theory, capital structure, and dividend substitution. Among the numerous 
studies on motivations for share repurchases, the signaling of undervaluation 
has been found to be the most popular motive. A survey conducted by Brav, 
Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) reports that over 80% of managers 
in the United States engage in repurchase activity when they perceive their 
stock to be undervalued by the market. 
If mangers are signaling undervaluation through share repurchases, it is 
worthwhile to evaluate if they in fact possess market-timing ability. Former 
studies report a positive drift in stock prices for several years following re-
purchase programs, suggesting evidence in favor of managerial timing ability 
(see e.g., Chan, Ikenberry, & Lee, 2007; Grullon & Michaely, 2004; Peyer & 
Vermaelen, 2009). However, these studies customarily assume that all re-
purchase programs are eventually realized, which is not consistent with em-
pirical evidence. 2 The continued research focus on repurchase programs is 
due to lax repurchase regulations in the United States. Although regulatory 
amendments since 2004 have made possible monthly record of repurchase 
trades through quarterly filings, the precise data on daily repurchase trans-
actions are still unavailable in the United States. 
                                      
1 Grullon and Michaely (2002), Li and McNally (2007), Vermaelen (1981), and Zhang (2005), among 
others. 
2 According to Jagannathan et al. (2000) a maximum of 70–80% of announcing firms conduct actual 
repurchases in United States. Further, according to Skjeltorp (2004), approximately 60% of the 
announcing firms in Norway repurchased their stock in the period between 1998 and 2001. 
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Zhang (2005) argues that managerial timing depends on the ability of the 
management to detect and take advantage of undervaluation errors in exe-
cuting repurchase transactions. Therefore, examining actual repurchase 
transactions is a crucial requirement for gaining meaningful insights into 
managerial timing ability. However, the overall empirical evidence on actual 
repurchases is relatively limited. Exploiting a unique data set of 7098 daily 
open-market repurchase transactions from the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) 
initiated between January 2005 and December 2014, we are able to analyze 
share repurchase transactions on a daily level. 
Our first objective is to estimate the price impact of share repurchase 
transactions and analyze how it may be explained by the various share 
repurchase motives. The strict disclosure requirements in Norway enable us 
to improve the understanding of repurchase motives. Our second and 
perhaps most important objective is to address whether managers possess 
market-timing ability in executing share repurchase transactions. This 
would enable us to reconcile academic literature on repurchases to the fact 
that CFOs list undervaluation as the principal motive behind repurchase 
decisions. 
Our study is particularly relevant in current context, as the Norwegian 
Government recently suggested raising the personal taxation on dividends. 
As the regulatory amendment may carry implications for Norwegian firms’ 
payout policy going forward, it is crucial for investors and regulators to fully 
grasp the intricacies of repurchase transactions when evaluating investment 
decisions and policy recommendations. 
For the Norwegian market, we find only one locally published study on 
share repurchases: Skjeltorp (2004). Skjeltorp studies the market reaction to 
repurchase announcements and implementations in the period shortly after 
share repurchases were allowed in Norway (1999–2001). Although the study 
is based on a limited data sample, it finds significant positive long-term 
abnormal returns for firms announcing a repurchase program, but not for 
repurchasing firms. Our study is a modest contribution to the limited 
empirical literature on actual share repurchases, and extends the study of 
Skjeltorp in several ways. First, our study covers a much longer period, from 
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2005 to 2014, thus significantly extending the data. Second, our study 
comprises a cross-sectional analysis based on repurchase transactions as 
opposed to repurchase programs. Finally, the analysis of the long-term 
performance contributes to the understanding of managerial timing ability 
in the context of share repurchase transactions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
the methods and regulatory requirements for share repurchases. Section 3 
presents the motives and empirical evidence for share repurchases. Section 
4 develops hypotheses related to our research question. Section 5 describes 
the data and methodology used in the paper. Section 6 presents the main 
empirical results. Section 7 concludes the paper and adds suggestions for 
further research. 
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2 Methods and Institutional Settings 
This section highlights the main share repurchase methods and contains 
a legal review of the Norwegian regulatory environment of open market 
repurchases (OMR). 
2.1 Repurchase methods 
Below we briefly describe the three most common types of share repur-
chase methods: Fixed-price tender offer, Dutch auction and OMR. It is im-
portant to note that OMR is the focus of our paper. 
Under a tender offer, a firm commits to repurchasing a specific number of 
shares at a fixed price during a limited period. In case the target number of 
shares is not met, the firm may decide to terminate the offer. Empirical 
evidence shows that the repurchase price is usually set at a significant pre-
mium of around 13–16% (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). 
A related method is the Dutch auction tender offer, where the process 
starts with the management announcing different prices at which it is pre-
pared to repurchase shares. Shareholders choosing to participate indicate 
how many shares they are willing to sell and the minimum acceptable selling 
price. At the close of the offer period, the firm pays the lowest price at which 
it can repurchase its desired number of shares. It is important to note that 
all tendering shareholders who meet the clearing price are offered the same 
price regardless of their indicated reservation price. Lie and McConnell 
(1998) find a small difference between excess announcement returns for ten-
der offers and Dutch auctions. 
Finally, in the case of OMR, the firm announces its intention to buy its 
shares and then proceeds to do so over time as any other investor would. 
This method provides firms with more flexibility in the timing and size of a 
repurchase transaction. While tender offers provide the greatest credibility, 
OMR programs are perceived to be least credible. This perception is con-
sistent with the findings of Comment and Jarrell (1991), who report average 
excess return of 11% for tender offers, 8% for Dutch auctions, and 3% for 
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OMR. Nonetheless, OMR programs offer managers greatest flexibility, and 
according to Allen and Michaely (2003) account for 95% of the dollar value 
of shares repurchased. 
 
2.2 Norwegian institutional settings 
In Norway, regulations enabling share repurchases came into effect in Jan-
uary 1999. Share repurchase activity is regulated by the Securities Act of 
June 13, 1997 (Aksjeloven) and the Securities Trading Act of June 29, 2007 
(Verdipapirhandelloven). Share repurchase programs are subject to safe-har-
bor exemptions, and are consequently not classified under market manipu-
lation as set out in chapter 3 of the Securities Trading Act. The main pur-
pose of these regulations is to ensure a transparent, secure, and efficient 
trade of financial instruments that affords equal treatment of all sharehold-
ers. 
To initiate a share repurchase program, it is required that two thirds of 
both the votes cast and share capital represented at the shareholder meeting 
be in favor of the repurchase plan. At the general meeting, the board must 
disclose all pertinent details related to the share repurchase program includ-
ing the objective of the program, method of repurchase, maximum number 
of shares to be repurchased, minimum and maximum amounts to be paid 
for shares, and the length of the program. After the shareholder authoriza-
tion is received, the firm must inform the OSE. The repurchasing firm has 
a maximum of two years to conduct the repurchase before it is required to 
have a new shareholder vote. However, getting shareholders’ approval does 
not mean that a firm is under any legal obligation to engage in repurchase 
transactions. Thus, many companies in Norway regularly seek their share-
holders’ approval, but do not go ahead with repurchase transactions. 
The Securities Trading Act allows a firm to buy back shares as long as it 
does not buy back more than 10% of the outstanding share capital. Further-
more, it is required that the firm’s total share capital less total nominal 
value of treasury shares be always higher than NOK 1 million. Until recently, 
the act also required firms to finance repurchases through retained earnings. 
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However, a recent provision in the act enables the use of debt to finance 
repurchases. 
All repurchase transactions conducted by the firm must be publicly dis-
closed immediately or at the latest prior to opening of the market the fol-
lowing business day. The repurchase notification must include price and 
volume of the transaction. According to the act, the repurchase price must 
not exceed the price of the last independent trade or the highest current 
independent bid at the OSE. In addition, the trade size cannot exceed 25% 
of the average traded volume of shares over the last calendar month. The 
shares repurchased by the firm are retained as treasury stock, which has no 
subscription, voting and cash flow rights. At a later stage the firm can decide 
to resell the treasury shares in the open market, use it to grant employees, 
or cancel it at its disposal. The precise use of treasury stock is also agreed 
upon at the point of repurchase authorization.
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3 Literature Review 
We divide our literature review into two sections, theoretical and empiri-
cal examinations. In the first section, we conduct a review of theories ad-
vanced in favor of share repurchases. This is followed by an empirical exam-
ination of related literature for our paper. 
 
3.1 Repurchase motivations 
Under perfect capital markets, a firm’s choice of payout policy has no 
bearing on its actual value (Miller & Modigliani, 1961). Firm value is essen-
tially a product of its investment policy; thereby its payout policy is irrele-
vant from the standpoint of value creation. In a frictionless world, a share 
repurchase has the same effect on cash-flow rights of shareholders as a divi-
dend does. However, as many of the underlying assumptions of perfect cap-
ital markets do not hold in the real world, we observe large discrepancies in 
payout policy across firms. 
Management’s motivation for share repurchases has been thoroughly dis-
cussed in previous literature. 3 It is important to note that at any one point, 
multiple factors may account for a firm’s decision to pursue a share repur-
chase (Dittmar, 2000). However, for the scope of our paper we mainly focus 
on the three most widely quoted motives for share repurchases: signaling 
undervaluation, agency theory and capital structure. 
Among the theories coined to explain the management’s decision to pursue 
share repurchases, is the traditional signaling hypothesis. The cornerstone 
of the signaling hypothesis is the information asymmetry that exists between 
a firm’s insiders and outsiders (Spence, 2002). The management of a firm 
holds insider knowledge with respect to the firm’s competitive position and 
future prospects, and as a result may disagree with the prevailing market 
pricing of its equity. Revealing this insider knowledge in an explicit manner 
could go against the competitive interests of the firm and may also lack 
                                      
3 Comment and Jarrell (1991), Dittmar (2000), Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) and Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998), among others. 
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credibility. Under this setting, a share repurchase provides a credible me-
dium to signal differences between management’s and the market’s percep-
tion of the true value of the firm (Vermaelen, 1984). The perceived under-
valuation by management is therefore considered the primary motive behind 
share repurchases. This is supported by a survey conducted by Brav et al. 
(2005). The results of their survey demonstrate that mangers indeed use 
repurchases to signal undervaluation. As a result, one should expect an ap-
preciation in the firm’s stock price following a share repurchase to correct 
for mispricing. 
According to Grullon and Michaely (2004), the perceived credibility of the 
share repurchase signal stems from the fact that a repurchase demands en-
gaging into a costly action by the firm. However, not all repurchase pro-
grams are realized, which cast doubt over the widely claimed signaling cred-
ibility of repurchase programs. Interestingly, Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) 
argue that a repurchase program is effectively equivalent to an exchange 
option whereby the firm acquires the flexibility to exchange its market value 
for its “fair” value at management’s discretion. Regardless of the 
management view on the current valuation of their stock, the exchange 
option offers considerable value, and the stock price should rise to recognize 
this value. However, Zhang (2005) argues that the value of the exchange 
option relies on the ability of the management to take advantage of 
valuation errors in making repurchase transactions. 
Another widely cited motive for share repurchases is that it provides an 
effective medium for management to distribute excess cash to shareholders. 
This distribution of excess cash helps overcome one of the most pertinent 
issues that arise as a result of separation of ownership and control, namely 
agency cost of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). In the presence of excess cash, 
managers may be tempted to allocate capital into value-depleting projects 
in an effort to increase the scale of business operations. Through cutting 
financial slack, there is reduced potential for managers to invest in negative 
NPV projects. As a result, the market usually greets share repurchases fa-
vorably to the extent it views potential for misalignment between managers’ 
and shareholders’ interests (Hackethal & Zdantchouk, 2006). 
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Although the distribution of excess cash can be achieved via both divi-
dends and share repurchases, share repurchases are inherently more flexible, 
allowing management significant leeway in distributing cash to shareholders. 
According to Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), repurchases do 
not mandate firm commitment. Hence, a firm announcing a share repurchase 
program may well terminate the program any time at its discretion without 
provoking any negative market reaction. On the other hand, dividends are 
a firm commitment and are expected to be offered on a regular basis by the 
market such that any dividend cut is typically greeted with a negative mar-
ket reaction (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1994). 4 
 On a similar note, Jagannathan et al. (2000) conclude that dividends are 
more likely used by firms with permanent excess cash balance, whereas re-
purchases are more likely used by firms with temporal excess cash balance. 
In addition, Grullon and Michaely (2002) argue for the dividend substitution 
hypothesis based on the tax differentials between dividend income and cap-
ital gains. However, given the equivalent tax treatment of dividend income 
and capital gains in Norway, it is unlikely that tax preference is a repurchase 
motive for Norwegian firms. 
The optimal leverage hypothesis holds that managers may conduct a share 
repurchase with a goal to fine-tune the firm’s capital structure, especially if 
the repurchase is debt financed. Under the assumption that an optimal lev-
erage ratio exists, the firm may conduct a repurchase to achieve this target 
ratio, which is expected to generate a positive market reaction (Bagwell & 
Shoven, 1989). 
Other potential motives for repurchases that are not within the scope of 
our paper include the option dilution hypothesis, takeover deterrence hy-
pothesis, earnings bump hypothesis, and finally the price support hypothesis. 
 
 
3.2 Related empirical literature 
                                      
4 Denis et al. (1994) and Ghosh and Woolridge (1989) find an average stock price drop of about 6% 
on the three days surrounding the announcement of a dividend cut. 
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 Empirical literature on share repurchases revolves around both its short- 
and long-term effects. As our paper seeks to address both effects, we find it 
imperative to review relevant findings in former studies. First, we review the 
short-term effects of share repurchases and examine the most relevant em-
pirical literature for our paper. Next, we provide empirical evidence pertain-
ing to long-term effects of share repurchases. 
Former research on share repurchases can be classified into two strands: 
studies that analyze the effect of share repurchase programs and studies that 
analyze the effect of share repurchase transactions. Although the focus of 
our study is on the latter, we consider it useful to provide a thorough account 
of both strands of literature to develop a better understanding of the under-
lying mechanisms driving these effects. Table 3.1 offers a selected list of 
prominent studies pertaining to both disciplines across various regions. 
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Table 3.1 Prior empirical results of abnormal returns from share repurchases 
Panel A: Abnormal returns from repurchase programs  
Country Author(s) 
Sample  
period Obs. 
Event 
window CAR 
US Ikenberry et al. (1995) 1980–1990 1239 (–2, +2) 3.50%*** 
 Stephens and Weisbach (1998) 1981–1990 591 (–1, +2) 2.70%*** 
 Grullon and Michaely (2002) 1980–1997 4443 (–1, +1) 2.57%*** 
 Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004) 1980–1996 5508 (–2, +2) 2.18%*** 
 Lie (2005) 1981–2000 4729 (–1, +1) 3.00%*** 
 Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) 1984–2001 6470 (–1, +1) 2.39%*** 
 Lee, Park, and Pearson (2015) 2007–2011 2395 (–2, +2) 1.37%*** 
      
UK Rau and Vermaelen (2002) 1985–1998 126 (–2, +2) 1.08%*** 
      
Canada Li and McNally (2007) 1987–2000 1702 (–1, +2) 0.73%*** 
      
Germany Andriosopoulos and Lasfer (2013) 1997–2006 194 (–1, +1) 2.32%*** 
      
France Ginglinger and L’her (2006) 1998–1999 363 (0, +1) 0.57%*** 
      
Australia Lamba and Ramsay (2000) 1989–1998 103 (–1, +1) 2.81%*** 
      
Japan Zhang (2002) 1995–1999 126 (–1, +2) 4.58%*** 
Panel B: Abnormal returns from repurchase transactions 
Country Author(s) 
Sample  
period Obs. 
Event 
window CAR 
UK Rees (1996) 1981–1990 882 (–2, +2) 0.30%*** 
      
Hong Kong Zhang (2005) 1993–1997 800 (0, +2) 0.43%*** 
      
Australia Akyol and Foo (2013) 1998–2008 927 (0, +1) 0.43%*** 
      
Norway Skjeltorp (2004) 1999–2000 100 (–1, +1) 0.88%*** 
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An examination of the extant literature reveals some interesting patterns. 
First, a vast majority of studies in the United States, where share repur-
chases are most prevalent, are focused on repurchase programs as opposed 
to studies in other regions that are geared towards repurchase transactions. 5 
This discrepancy in the literature is in accordance with the observed regu-
latory differences. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules 
do not enforce repurchasing firms to report actual repurchase activity, in 
addition to the basic, standard disclosure in the quarterly financial state-
ments. This is in sharp contrast to most other regions including Norway; 
where there are stringent regulations mandating repurchasing firms to sep-
arately disclose repurchase activity on a daily account. 
Second, while abnormal returns are positive across all studies, they are 
slightly higher in the United States than in other regions, particularly Eu-
rope. This could again be attributed to regulatory differences between the 
United States and other regions. While a decision to announce a share re-
purchase program is subject to board approval in the United States, the 
same decision in most other countries, including Norway, needs to be au-
thorized by shareholders at the shareholder meeting. Manconi, Peyer, and 
Vermaelen (2013) argue that in “shareholder approval” countries, repur-
chase authorizations are routinely requested at annual general meetings, 
therefore share repurchase announcements in these countries are often ex-
pected, which explains their relatively lower abnormal returns. 
Third, there appears to be a decline in abnormal returns relating to share 
repurchases in the recent past, at least in the United States. Lee, Park, and 
Pearson, (2015) find that recent announcements of share repurchase pro-
grams are arguably more driven by pressure from short-term-oriented insti-
tutional investors and changes in executive compensation policy. 
Finally, we observe that the average abnormal returns on share repurchase 
programs are larger in magnitude in comparison to average abnormal returns 
                                      
5 According to Manconi et al. (2013), since 1998, approximately 10% of all US listed firms announced 
a share repurchase program. 
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on share repurchase transactions. This stem from the fact that a price ad-
justment is already incurred at the point of repurchase program; hence, a 
subsequent adjustment at the point of repurchase transaction is relatively 
smaller in scale. 6 
Regarding the earlier-stated motives of share repurchases, there is over-
whelming empirical support for the signaling undervaluation hypothesis, 
whereby firms use share repurchases to signal mispricing of their stock. No-
table studies in this regard include Comment and Jarrell (1991), Dann 
(1981), Ikenberry et al. (1995), and Vermaelen (1981), among others. These 
are complemented by CFO surveys including those of Brav et al. (2005) and 
Mitchell, Dharmawan, and Clarke (2001). With respect to the agency cost 
of free cash flow hypothesis, Jagannathan et al. (2000) and Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) argue that firms with excess cash flows enjoy higher ab-
normal returns after the announcement of a repurchase program. 
Concerning the long-term effects of share repurchase programs, Ikenberry 
et al. (1995) find significant abnormal returns. They assert that the long-
term abnormal returns of share repurchase programs are driven by initial 
market under-reaction. Their findings are confirmed by a host of subsequent 
international studies including Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2007) and Zhang 
(2002), among others. However, Yook (2010) argues that long-term abnor-
mal performance originates from program announcing firms that subse-
quently execute repurchase transactions. This is consistent with the evidence 
presented by Lie (2005) who finds significant improvements in long-term 
operating performance of program announcing firms that execute repurchase 
transactions. 
However, these findings contrast with that of Skjeltorp (2004), who argues 
that the presence of long-term abnormal returns in Norway is due to the 
portion of firms that do not subsequently execute share repurchase transac-
tions. He finds that program announcing firms that do not subsequently 
repurchase are on average more cash constrained. Therefore these firms are 
                                      
6 Zhang (2005) argues that the difference in abnormal returns is expected because a repurchase 
program announcement represents a major corporate decision; however, a repurchase transaction 
represents a mere implementation of the repurchase program. 
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not able to signal mispricing through repurchase transactions, and continue 
to remain undervalued. At a later stage, positive information surprises 
through earning announcements drive the abnormal performance of these 
firms. Another interesting study by Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) finds 
that there are differences in motives of frequent and infrequent repurchasers, 
and as confirmed by Yook (2010), long-term abnormal returns are indeed 
attributed to infrequent repurchasers. 
On the other hand, Bradford (2008) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) find 
no evidence of abnormal returns experienced by announcing firms. Fama 
(1998) argues that studies of long-term abnormal returns are susceptible to 
sampling bias in addition to choice of expected return model; this is probably 
why we observe variation in the results of the quoted studies. Another in-
teresting issue when estimating long-term performance is the inclusion of 
transaction costs. McNally and Smith (2007) show that anomalies related to 
long-term behavior of announcing firms vanish once transaction costs are 
accounted for. 
The presented controversial empirical evidence on long-term abnormal 
performance has resulted in a discourse about the managerial timing ability 
of stock repurchases. 
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4 Hypothesis Development 
As earlier stated, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we attempt 
to investigate repurchase motives by evaluating cross-sectional differences 
in the initial price impact. Second, we investigate whether managers are able 
to time the market when executing share repurchase transactions. The ex-
tant literature review provides us with a basis to develop the following 
framework for testable hypotheses. 
4.1 Hypotheses related to the price impact 
The price impact of share repurchases is widely examined across countries. 
Table 3.1 in Section 3.2 provides consistent evidence of significant positive 
abnormal returns for share repurchase transactions on the event day. In 
accordance with the previous studies, we develop the following hypotheses: 
H0. There is no positive price impact of share repurchase transactions on 
the event day. 
H1. There is a positive price impact of share repurchase transactions on the 
event day. 
In case the null hypothesis is rejected, we aim to further understand which 
repurchase motives can explain the positive price reaction on the event day. 
To achieve this purpose, we formulate the following set of auxiliary hypoth-
eses: 
H1.1. The signaling undervaluation hypothesis explains the positive price 
impact. 
As discussed in Section 3.1, the most commonly quoted reason for share 
repurchases is the managers’ perception that their stock is undervalued. Fol-
lowing Chan et al. (2004), we use firm size, intangibles-to-assets ratio, re-
purchase size, market-to-book ratio, and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) preceding repurchase transactions to proxy for the signaling under-
valuation hypothesis. 
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According to Vermaelen (1981), smaller firms are exposed to more infor-
mation asymmetry and are therefore more likely to be mispriced as opposed 
to larger firms, which typically have wider media and analyst coverage. 
Hence, we expect that the price impact is negatively related to firm size. 
Similarly, Barth and Kasznik (1999) argue that there is greater uncertainty 
about the value of a firm with a higher ratio of intangibles-to-assets and 
therefore such a firm experiences a higher degree of information asymmetry. 
Further, we include the size of the repurchase transaction to capture the 
credibility of the undervaluation signal. Although this variable could be re-
lated to all three auxiliary hypotheses, Chan et al. (2004) argue that the size 
of the repurchase transaction is most consistent with the signaling under-
valuation hypothesis. Thus, we expect the repurchase size to be positively 
related to the market reaction. Another key metric that captures the extent 
of undervaluation and investment opportunities is the firm’s market-to-book 
ratio. Dittmar (2000) suggests that high market-to-book firms (growth firms) 
are less likely to be perceived as being undervalued by the market as opposed 
to low market-to-book firms (value firms). Therefore, we should expect a 
higher positive market reaction to repurchase transactions carried out by 
value firms. Finally, Zhang (2005) finds that share repurchase transactions 
that are preceded by a negative drift in the stock price, generate a stronger 
undervaluation signal. Therefore, we expect prior share price performance 
to be negatively related to the price impact of repurchase transactions. 
H1.2. The agency cost of free cash flow hypothesis explains the positive 
price impact. 
As argued by Jensen (1986), firms with an excess cash balance are faced 
with agency conflicts surging from self-interested managers who use excess 
funds to their benefit. These agency conflicts impose a penalty on firms, and 
by disgorging cash through a share repurchase, managers can tax-efficiently 
recover this penalty (Chan et al., 2004). Following Fenn and Liang (2001) 
we use earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) less cap-
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ital expenditures scaled by assets as our proxy for free cash flow. This coef-
ficient is expected to be positive, as distribution of cash to shareholder will 
mitigate possible agency conflicts. In a similar fashion, Hatakeda and 
Isagawa (2004) argue that the market is likely to react more positively to 
repurchases by firms with lower return on assets as opposed to repurchases 
conducted by firms with higher return on assets. This argument implies that 
the market rewards only repurchases made by firms that have unattractive 
investment opportunities. Return on assets is therefore included as another 
explanatory variable in our regression equation, and the coefficient is ex-
pected to be negative. 
H1.3. The optimal capital structure hypothesis explains the positive price 
impact. 
Under the optimal leverage hypothesis, a firm may use share repurchases 
to optimize its capital structure (Bagwell & Shoven, 1989). An optimal level 
of leverage not only should lead to an interest tax subsidy, but also should 
reduce agency costs. Following Dittmar (2000) and Grullon and Michaely 
(2004), we use total debt scaled to assets for testing the hypothesis related 
to optimum financial leverage. We expect abnormal returns to be positively 
related to leverage. 
The null for each of the auxiliary hypotheses is that they do not explain 
the positive price impact from share repurchases. We summarize the 
auxiliary hypotheses in the following table: 
Table 4.1 Summary of hypotheses and predictions  
Variables Predicted sign   Hypothesis 
Firm Size Negative   
Signaling 
Undervaluation 
Intangibles-to-assets Positive  
Prior drift in share price Negative  
Market-to-book Negative  
Repurchase size Positive   
Cash Positive  Agency cost of 
 free cash flow Return on assets Negative   
Leverage Positive   Optimal capital structure 
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4.2 Hypotheses related to managerial timing ability  
The market timing hypothesis states that managers can buy back shares 
at lower prices through their informational advantage about the “true” value 
of the stock (De Cesari, Espenlaub, Khurshed, & Simkovic, 2012). Therefore, 
if managers are able to time the market, they can transfer wealth from 
tendering to non-tendering shareholders (Fried, 2005a). Although the Secu-
rity Trading Act in Norway prohibits managers from conducting buybacks 
based on inside information, we are not aware of any case where a repurchase 
has led to regulatory sanctions for insider trading. In fact, repurchase trades 
that meet the requirements of the commission regulation are subject to safe 
harbors. Evidence pertaining to managerial timing of share repurchase trans-
actions is supported by Chan et al. (2007) and Yook (2010), who find sig-
nificant positive long-term abnormal performance for repurchasing firms. 
This leads to our final hypotheses: 
H0. Repurchasing firms do not experience long-term abnormal returns. 
H2. Repurchasing firms experience long-term abnormal returns. 
  
19  5 Data and Methodology  
 
5 Data and Methodology 
5.1 Data description 
In this section, we provide a descriptive summary of the entire share re-
purchase activity conducted on the OSE from the start of 2005 until the end 
of 2014. The share repurchase data are collected from the OSE, and daily 
share price data are collected from Amadeus (Børs Prosjektet), a data ser-
vice operated at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). Table 5.1 pro-
vides a summary of all share repurchase transactions executed by all repur-
chasing firms across our sample period. 
Table 5.1 Summary descriptive of all repurchases in Norway 2005–2014 
Number of firms     189 
Number of repurchase events     7098 
Total number of shares repurchased (in millions)   1223.7 
Aggregate value of shares repurchased (in billion NOK)  60.8 
Number of firms with 1 repurchase event   28 
Number of firms with 2–10 repurchase events   65 
Number of firms with 11–20 repurchase events   36 
Number of firms with 21–40 repurchase events   17 
Number of firms with over 40 repurchase events     43 
From 2005 to 2014, 189 firms conducted in total 7098 repurchase transac-
tions valued at NOK 60.8 billion. 
 
Figure 5.1 Aggregate repurchases (left scale) vs. number of repurchases (right scale) 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Ag
gr
eg
at
e n
um
be
r o
f r
ep
ur
ch
as
es
Ag
gr
eg
at
e A
nn
ua
l r
ep
ur
ch
as
es
 (b
ill
ion
 o
f N
OK
)
Aggregate Repurchase Value (BNOK) Number of Repurchases OSEAX
5 Data and Methodology  20 
 
From Figure 5.1 we note that both the number of repurchasing firms and 
share repurchase events peaked during the height of the financial crisis in 
the year 2008. This indicates Norwegians firms’ tendency to repurchase more 
during recessionary periods. On the contrary, Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) 
show that in the United States, repurchase activity rises during boom peri-
ods and falls during recessionary periods. However, as evident from Figure 
5.1, the aggregate value of share repurchases in 2008 is lower than that of 
some of the other years in our sample, and we expect this to be the result 
of the depressed equity market. 
 
Figure 5.2 Repurchases vs. dividends as % of total payout on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
Since share repurchases were allowed in the United States, firms have 
increasingly substituted dividends with share repurchases, which is now the 
dominant mean of payout (Skinner, 2008). 7 Rixtel and Villegas (2015) re-
port that share repurchases totaled approximately USD 950 billion in 2013–
2014. From Figure 5.2 we clearly see that share repurchases have not gained 
the same popularity in Norway as in the United States, representing a low 
share of the total capital distributed to investors. 
Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics for the size of repurchase activity 
across sample period. First, we observe that the number of repurchase trans-
actions that involve buying back 1% or more of the total shares outstanding 
                                      
7 In 2004, repurchases for US industrials were USD 155 billion while dividends were USD 137 billion. 
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have generally decreased in the post financial crisis period. Second, through-
out our sample period, we observe that roughly 90% of repurchase events 
involved buying back less than 0.5% of the total shares outstanding. This 
may be the result of low market liquidity, making it difficult to process large 
block transactions. 
Table 5.2 Yearly distribution of share repurchases by the % of daily purchase transactions 
Size of repurchase Number of repurchase events by year   
(%)* 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total ≥1% 21 19 13 20 9 8 9 6 10 6 121 
0.90–0.99 4 3 2 5 0 1 1 1 0 0 17 
0.80–0.89 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 
0.70–0.79 2 11 4 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 22 
0.60–0.69 1 4 3 5 4 1 2 1 1 0 22 
0.50–0.59 5 11 9 9 3 1 3 0 1 1 43 
 <0.50 449 829 691 1017 515 552 890 756 572 595 6866 
Total 483 880 724 1056 533 563 907 764 585 603 7098 
 
Further examination of our data in Table 5.3 reveals that out of the total 
sample of 189 firms, 22 firms bought back more than 10% of their shares 
outstanding over our sample period. Note that this exceeds the 10% regula-
tory threshold, but this is probably achieved through multiple repurchase 
programs or through cancellation of treasury shares. Moreover, 103 firms 
bought back between 1% and 10% of total shares outstanding and 45 firms 
bought back less than 0.5% of their total shares outstanding across the same 
period. This implies that although firms generally repurchase a minuscule 
fraction of total shares outstanding in any one share repurchase transaction, 
on the whole, most firms buy back more than 1% of their shares outstanding 
through multiple transactions. This is clear as approximately 85% of firms 
in our sample register more than one repurchase transaction. 
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Table 5.3 Size of repurchase by all repurchasing firms 
Size of repurchase (%)* Number of firms 
Above 10% 22 
1.00–10.00 103 
0.76–0.99 8 
0.50–0.75 12 
Below 0.50 45 
Total 189 
* Cumulative repurchases across sample period 
Since the focus of this study is on the OMR of the ordinary shares traded 
at the OSE, we exclude equity certificates from our event sample. As some 
firms may engage in repurchase activity over consecutive days, it could lead 
to clustering of events. To control for clustering bias, we employ a 21-day 
filter between each repurchase transaction. If we considered each repurchase 
transaction, then firms with a higher repurchase frequency, such as Telenor, 
would dominate the sample portfolio returns. 8 Conversely, if we only focused 
on the first repurchase transaction for each firm then we ignore much useful 
information in the subsequent repurchases. The 21-day restriction further 
ensures that repurchase transactions are not overlapping in the event 
window. Further, to isolate the effect of repurchase trades and their publi-
cation, we exclude those events that have announced price–affecting infor-
mation on the same day or the trading day prior to the announcement day. 9 
This leaves us with a final sample for the analysis of 819 repurchase events 
conducted by 154 firms. 10 Other information, such as daily index prices and 
Fama–French factors, is obtained from Bent Ødegaard’s website at BI’s 
asset- pricing center. In addition, accounting data are retrieved from Thom-
son Reuters Datastream. 
 
                                      
8 In the sample period, Telenor conducted a total of 305 repurchase transactions against an average 
of 37 repurchase transactions per firm. 
9 Using a matlab code, we extract press-release information from the OSE database (Newsweb) 
surrounding the three-day event window for all repurchase transactions. 
10 A total of 347 announcements are excluded because of reported price-affecting information, 5304 
announcements are excluded after employing the 21-day filter, 114 announcements are excluded be-
cause they have a return history too short for estimating the market-model parameters and 514 
announcements are excluded due to lack of share price and accounting data. 
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5.2 Methodology 
This section presents and evaluates the methodologies employed to test 
the stated hypotheses in Section 4. Our analysis is conducted in three stages. 
First, we present a standard event study methodology for examining the 
price impact of share repurchase transactions. Second, we describe the 
regression equation applied to test the repurchase motives that explain the 
price impact. Finally, we evaluate the choice of long-term performance 
estimation methods to test for the managerial timing ability. 
 
Univariate analysis 
For the univariate analysis, we use standard event study methodology, as 
proposed by MacKinlay (1997), to measure the sample securities’ mean and 
cumulative mean abnormal returns, surrounding share repurchases. To esti-
mate abnormal returns, we use the market model. It is widely accepted that 
the use of more sophisticated models has little effect on abnormal returns 
when examining the short-term market impact. 11 
To estimate the model parameters, a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression is applied for each stock 𝑖𝑖 over a 250-day period prior to the event 
window, using the OSEAX All Share Index as the proxy for the market 
return. The announcement window is defined as the day of the public an-
nouncement of a repurchase transaction, according to the OSE database. To 
capture price movements surrounding share repurchases, we find it suitable 
to use an event window of 21 days, from day –10 to day +10 relative to the 
event day. Figure 5.3 illustrates the timing sequence of the event study. 
                                      
11 See Brown and Warner (1985) and Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997). 
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Figure 5.3 Timing of the event study 
Applying the market model, the expected daily return is calculated as, 
 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = 𝛼𝛼?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡  (5.1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the expected return for stock 𝑖𝑖 at day 𝑡𝑡, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is the return on 
the market index for day 𝑡𝑡, 𝛼𝛼?̂?𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽?̂?𝑖 are the market-model parameters. 
Because several companies at the OSE, and hence in our sample, are not 
traded daily, our OLS 𝛽𝛽 may be biased due to nonsynchronous trading, see 
Brown and Warner (1985). To reduce the potential bias, 𝛽𝛽 is adjusted using 
the Scholes and Williams (1977) procedure, calculated as, 
 
 𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊 = 𝛽𝛽?̂?𝑖− + 𝛽𝛽?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽?̂?𝑖+1 + 2𝜌𝜌?̂?𝑀  (5.2) 
 
where 𝜌𝜌?̂?𝑀  is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the return on the 
market and 𝛽𝛽?̂?𝑖−, 𝛽𝛽?̂?𝑖, 𝛽𝛽?̂?𝑖+ are the lagged, matching, and leading beta estimates, 
respectively. 
The abnormal return is calculated as the difference between actual return 
and the expected return in the event window, 
 
 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − (𝛼𝛼?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡) (5.3) 
 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the abnormal return of firm 𝑖𝑖 at day 𝑡𝑡 in the event period, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the actual share return on firm 𝑖𝑖 at day 𝑡𝑡 in the event period, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is 
the return on the market index at time 𝑡𝑡 in the event period, 𝛼𝛼?̂?𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽?̂?𝑖 are 
the market model parameters. 
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By cumulating the abnormal returns from the event window, we can cal-
culate the estimated average CAR across all firms as,  
 
 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2) = 1𝑁𝑁 � � 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+10𝑖𝑖=−10𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1  (5.4) 
 
where N is the total number of firms/events. 
The null hypothesis to be tested is that the CAR during the event widow 
is equal to zero. To determine the statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns and the CARs, we use the standard test statistic proposed in Brown 
and Warner (1985). 
 
Cross-sectional analysis 
We conduct a multiple regression analysis to examine which repurchase 
motives explain the price impact in the announcement window. For our 
dependent variable, we focus on CARs over one trading day before the event 
up until one trading day after the event, CAR (–1, +1). As firms can report 
to the OSE before the trading starts on the following day, day –1 captures 
the effect of market participants detecting the presence of the firm through 
abnormal trading volume or increased demand for the shares, putting an 
upward pressure on the price. The auxiliary hypotheses discussed in Section 
4 lead us to the following regression equation, 
 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏1,𝜏𝜏2� =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏1−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏1−𝑘𝑘+ 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏1−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏+ 𝛽𝛽8𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (5.5) 
 
where 𝛼𝛼 is the intercept term, 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏1,𝜏𝜏2� is the CAR of firm 𝑖𝑖 over trad-
ing day –1 up to trading day +1 relative to the repurchase day, 𝜏𝜏  are the 
variables respective values at the last reported date before the event. See 
Table A.2 in the Appendix A for a description of the variables. 
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Measuring long-term abnormal performance 
As documented in several former studies of corporate events, long-term 
performance analysis presents a classical test of managerial timing ability. 
As opposed to short-term performance measurement, long-term performance 
measurement is confronted with severe challenges entailing accurate risk ad-
justments. While the errors in risk adjustments in estimating abnormal per-
formance over a short horizon may have trivial effects, these errors can have 
economically significant effects for estimating abnormal performance over a 
long horizon. Further, the use of historical risk estimates becomes irrelevant 
for long-term event studies as events are typically followed by periods of 
unusual price performance. Therefore, it is a standard practice to estimate 
abnormal performance over a long horizon based on post-event estimates. 
However, this estimation requires the use of an expected-return model, and 
as Fama (1998, p. 291) notes: “all models for expected returns are incomplete 
descriptions of the systematic patterns in average returns.” In this regard, 
long-term event studies are essentially joint tests of market efficiency as well 
as the model of expected returns. 
The two most widely used methods for measuring and calibrating post- 
event risk-adjusted performance are the buy-and-hold average returns 
(BHAR) and Jensen’s alpha (also known as calendar-time portfolio). The 
rapid growth of academic literature over the past two decades has overcome 
many of the statistical biases associated with these approaches, but as 
Kothari and Warner (2007, p. 28) note: “Despite an extensive literature, 
there is still no clear winner in a horse race.” Therefore, we choose to imple-
ment both of these approaches to enhance the credibility of our findings. 
 
Buy-and-Hold Average Return (BHAR) 
The BHAR approach is widely renowned for its ability to precisely reflect 
investors’ actual investment experiences as opposed to the periodic rebalanc-
ing required in the application of the calendar-time approach (Barber & 
Lyon, 1997). Mitchell and Stafford (2000, p. 296) describe BHAR as “the 
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average multiyear return from a strategy of investing in all firms that com-
plete an event and selling at the end of a pre-specified holding period versus 
a comparable strategy using otherwise similar nonevent firms”. The none-
vent firms are typically matched against event firms based on their respec-
tive size and book-to-market values. However, given the relatively limited 
choice of firms listed on the OSE, it is difficult to conduct a matching pro-
cedure in an optimal manner. Additionally, as argued by Kothari and 
Warner (1997), it is not necessarily enough to match firms based on size and 
book-to-market, but also on other firm characteristics. Therefore, we choose 
to match returns of a repurchasing firm against its relevant industry bench-
mark index. The use of market indices as a benchmark is in line with 
McNally and Smith (2007). Following Ikenberry et al. (1995), an equal 
weighting scheme is applied to the portfolio of repurchasing firms. The 
portfolio is rebalanced at the end of each year to ensure that a small set of 
firms with extreme compounded returns does not dominate the return 
calculation in the next period. Accordingly, BHAR reflects the difference 
between the compounded daily returns of the repurchasing firm and the 
compounded daily return of the relevant Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) value-weighted benchmark index. This is shown by the 
equation below: 
 
 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = ��1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� − 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 ��1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1  (5.6) 
 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the compounded return of security 𝑖𝑖 from 𝑡𝑡 = 1 to 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀 , and 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 is the compounded return of the relevant benchmark index from 𝑡𝑡 = 1 
to 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀 . 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 provides an estimate of the compounded abnormal return 
of security 𝑖𝑖 over the holding period 𝑀𝑀 . 
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We estimate BHAR for various holding periods including 1, 2, and 3 years 
after the repurchase incident. The average BHAR for each respective holding 
period is computed as the equally weighted average of each individual BHAR: 
 
 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅������������������� =  �𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1  (5.7) 
 
However, the BHAR approach is prone to a number of statistical issues, 
which cast doubt over its validity. The criticism put forward by Kothari and 
Warner (2007) is that long-term returns tend to be rightly skewed which 
departs from the normality assumption underlying many statistical tests. 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that this skewness is partially a by-prod-
uct of cross-sectional dependence of event firms’ abnormal returns that are 
overlapping in calendar time. As a result, t-statistics can be overstated up 
to four times the normal size. Another issue related to BHAR is that it is 
extremely vulnerable to the bad-model problem due to the compounding 
effect of systematic errors (Fama, 1998). 
 
Calendar-time portfolio 
This approach requires constructing calendar-time portfolio returns of 
firms that complete an event, and calibrating whether they are abnormal in 
a single-factor (CAPM) or multifactor (Fama–French three-factor and Car-
hart four-factor) regression. Any abnormal performance is captured by the 
estimated intercept of the regression, alpha. Our application of Jensen’s al-
pha methodology involves constructing a calendar-time portfolio of repur-
chasing firms. The portfolio is rebalanced on a monthly basis whereby each 
stock is allocated an equal weight. The rebalancing activity is likely to carry 
some transaction costs; however, we do not expect these costs to have a 
material effect on our results due to monthly rebalancing. Similar assump-
tions are made by Chan et al. (2007) and Yook (2010) in their analyses. Any 
firm that executes a repurchase in any given month is included in the port-
folio the first day of the following month, and stays in the portfolio until it 
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is subjected to any significant corporate event, such as acquisitions or delist-
ing. We test for abnormal performance across different portfolio holding pe-
riods of 1, 2, and 3 years. Each repurchasing firm is part of the portfolio for 
the duration of the corresponding holding period after which it is removed, 
and added back only if it executes another repurchase transaction. This 
framework ensures that at any one given point, the portfolio contains only 
those firms that are both alive and have initiated repurchases that corre-
spond to the chosen holding period. 
As noted earlier, abnormal return estimation under calendar-time portfo-
lio approach involves measuring daily portfolio returns relative to a bench-
mark model. We choose the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model as our benchmarks. Similar to BHAR, 
market returns are based on a value-weighted index. This is in accordance 
with the fact that our sample is fairly dominated by large firms. We first 
estimate daily portfolio returns and regress excess portfolio returns on the 
relevant risk factors based on the following equations, 
 
 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  (5.8) 
 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝+ 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�                                  + 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
(5.9) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 is the equally weighted portfolio return of repurchasing firms for 
calendar month 𝑡𝑡, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return of firm 𝑖𝑖 for calendar month 𝑡𝑡, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the 
respective weight associated to each firm in the calendar-time monthly port-
folio, 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 is our proxy for the risk-free rate, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡, 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡, 𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡, 
are the returns on the market benchmark, size, book-to-market and momen-
tum portfolios respectively, and the 𝛽𝛽′𝑠𝑠  are the portfolios’ exposures. 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 measures the average monthly abnormal return on the portfolio of repur-
chasing firms relative to excess return on the factor portfolios. Under the 
null hypothesis, 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 is expected to be zero. 
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The main merit of this approach is that it is immune to biases originating 
from cross-correlations between event firms. By forming monthly calendar-
time portfolios, all cross-correlations of event firms’ abnormal returns are 
automatically reflected in the portfolio variance. Hence, the distribution of 
abnormal returns is better approximated by the normal distribution, allow-
ing for classical statistical inferences. Further, unlike event-time methods, 
calendar-time approach controls for clustering of events and is not 
particularly exposed to pseudo market timing. 12 This is especially important 
in our case as the vast majority of repurchases are executed in depressed 
equity markets. 
However, the calendar-time approach may suffer from heteroskedasticity 
due to the changing composition of the portfolio, as the number of repur-
chasing firms varies each month (Lyon, Barber, & Tsai, 1999).  
                                      
12 Schultz (2003) defines pseudo market timing as that which occurs when managers time corporate 
events based on prior stock performance and ex-post empirical analysis detects abnormal returns, 
even when there is no mispricing ex-ante. 
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6 Empirical Results 
We examine the price impact of repurchase transactions in Section 6.1, 
the relationship between the price impact and repurchase motives in Section 
6.2, and the long-term performance of repurchasing firms in Section 6.3. 
 
6.1 Short-term price impact of repurchase transactions 
This section presents the short-term price impact around share repurchase 
transactions. In Table 6.1, we present the abnormal share price performance 
surrounding the repurchase event day for the full sample. Panel A illustrates 
daily abnormal returns and daily CARs, while Panel B illustrates CARs over 
five sub-windows. The window (–10, –2) is used to examine pre-event drift 
in abnormal returns. The window (–1, +1) and (0, +1) are used to capture 
the initial market reaction to repurchase transactions. Finally, CAR (+2, 
+10) is used to examine the short-term market response following the event 
day. 
 
Figure 6.1 Event window CARs 
This figure presents CARs from day –10 to day +10 around share repurchase transactions 
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Table 6.1 Abnormal returns and CARs around repurchase transactions 
We use standard event study methodology based on the market model. The market Index is the 
OSEAX All Share Index. The estimation period is from 261 to 11 days prior to the announcement 
and day 0 is the announcement date. The sample consists of 819 share repurchase trades for the 
period January 2005 to December 2014. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Daily ARs and CARs relative to actual share repurchase day   
Day   AR (%)   t-stat   CAR (%)   
–10  –0.056  –0.80  –0.056  
–9  –0.115  –1.40  –0.172  
–8  –0.061  –0.75  –0.233  
–7  –0.063  –0.76  –0.296  
–6  0.043  0.52  –0.253  
–5  –0.158 * –1.92  –0.411  
–4  –0.039  –0.47  –0.450  
–3  –0.176 ** –2.14  –0.626  
–2  –0.026  –0.31  –0.652  
–1  0.074  0.90  –0.577  
0  0.188 ** 2.28  –0.390  
+1  0.280 *** 3.40  –0.109  
+2  –0.009  –0.11  –0.119  
+3  0.052  0.63  –0.067  
+4  –0.082  –0.99  –0.149  
+5  –0.062  –0.75  –0.211  
+6  0.111  1.34  –0.100  
+7  0.086  1.04  –0.014  
+8  –0.013  –0.15  –0.027  
+9  –0.062  –0.75  –0.088  
+10  0.030  0.37  –0.058  
Panel B: CARs over different intervals   
Event window     CAR (%)   t-stat     
Day –10 to –2   –0.652 *** –2.63   
Day –1 to +1   0.542 *** 3.80   
Day 0 to +1   0.468 *** 4.01   
Day +2 to +10   0.051  0.21   
Day –10 to +10     –0.058  –0.15     
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The mean CAR (–10, –2) value for all repurchasing firms is –0.65%, and 
it is significantly different from zero. From Figure 6.1 we observe a price 
decline in share price before a repurchase transaction, which may indicate 
that managers on average time repurchases after a negative drift in the stock 
price. The result is consistent with Ikenberry et al. (2000) who argue that 
managers repurchase more in periods when the stock price declines, as they 
may perceive the firm to be undervalued. The initial market reaction to the 
announcement is significantly positive with a CAR of 0.54% in the (–1, +1) 
window and 0.47% for the (0, +1) window. This suggests that on average, 
repurchase transactions have a positive impact on stock prices. Although 
the positive response is statistically significant from zero, the economic mag-
nitude is relatively small. After the event, the CAR for the (+2, +10) win-
dow is insignificant. This is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis 
which states that information should be impounded into the stock price 
around the event (Ikenberry et al., 2000). 
 
Table 6.2 Industry effects on CARs 
The table presents CARs in the pre-event and event windows by industry category. We use standard 
event-study methodology based on the market model. The market index is the OSEAX All Share 
Index. The estimation period is from 261 to 11 days prior to the announcement, and day 0 is the 
announcement date. The sample consists of 819 share repurchase trades for the period January 2005 
to December 2014. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 CAR (–10, –2)  CAR (–1, +1)  CAR (0, +1) 
  CAR(%) t-stat.   CAR(%) t–stat.   CAR(%) t–stat. 
Oil & Gas –0.003 –0.82  0.003 1.26  0.002 1.30 
Basic Materials 0.007 0.39  0.002 0.17  0.002 0.26 
Industrials –1.210** –2.42  0.800*** 2.76  0.540** 2.27 
Consumer Discretionary –0.015 –0.94  –1.760* –1.91  –0.004 –0.47 
Consumer Staples –0.009 –0.81  –0.002 –0.33  –0.001 –0.16 
Health Care 0.011 0.86  1.670** 2.28  1.720*** 2.89 
Financials –0.002 –0.30  0.002 0.44  0.000 0.10 
Information Technology –1.900** –2.57  0.990** 2.31  0.950*** 2.72 
Telecommunication 0.018 1.57   0.009 1.35   0.005 0.87 
 
Table 6.2 illustrates the pre-event and event CARs for nine industry cat-
egories. On average, the price decline prior to a repurchase transaction is 
highest for information technology and industrial firms. Further, the initial 
market reaction is most pronounced for health care firms. 
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In sum, the average initial market response to repurchase transactions is 
significantly positive, which leads us to reject the null and conclude that 
repurchase transactions have a positive impact on share prices. Our results 
are consistent with the findings in several studies including Akyol and Foo 
(2013), Skjeltorp (2004) and Zhang (2005). However, the price impact of 
repurchase transactions is not substantial, which is in line with our earlier 
discussion in the literature review. As it is mandatory that Norwegian firms 
obtain shareholders’ approval prior to embarking on repurchase programs, 
firms’ repurchase transactions are partly anticipated. 
 
6.2 Relationship between CARs and firm characteristics 
In this section, we perform a cross-sectional analysis consistent with our 
auxiliary hypotheses. Following Akyol and Foo (2013), we regress the CARs 
from the announcement window (–1, +1) and (0, +1) on several firm and 
repurchase characteristics known to proxy for repurchase motives. Table A.1 
in Appendix A illustrates the descriptive statistics on firm and repurchase 
characteristics for the 154 sample firms used in the cross-sectional regres-
sions. 
In Table 6.3, we present the results from the regressions of the CARs on 
repurchase and firm characteristics. A pooled OLS regression is employed to 
estimate our results. To test whether this is in fact correct, we first employ 
the Hausman specification tests to decide between fixed or random effects. 
Since we cannot reject the null at a significant level, the random-effect model 
is preferable to a fixed-effect model. Second, we employ the Breusch–Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier test to choose between the random-effect model and 
simple pooled OLS regression. Here we also fail to reject the null and 
conclude that pooled OLS regression is the preferred model. Moreover, to 
test for multicollinearity, we employ the variance inflation factor (VIF) test. 
As none of the explanatory variables exceed the threshold recommended by 
Wooldridge (2003), our regression does not suffer from multicollinearity. See 
Appendix B for test results. 
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Table 6.3 Cross-sectional regressions on CARs 
The table reports regressions of CARs from the announcement windows (–1, +1) and (0, +1) on 
repurchase and firm characteristics. See Table A.2 in Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample 
consists of 819 share repurchase transactions for the period January 2005 to December 2014. The 
standard errors of the coefficients have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) 
procedure. p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 CAR (–1, +1)  CAR (0, +1) 
Ln(Size) –0.001**  –0.001* 
 (0.047)  (0.068) 
Pre-CAR (–10,–2) –0.059**  –0.002* 
 (0.023)  (0.094) 
Repurchase Size –0.495  –0.318 
 (0.105)  (0.151) 
Return on assets –0.006  0.008 
 (0.823)  (0.756) 
Market-to-book –0.000  –0.000 
 (0.164)  (0.121) 
Intangibles-to-assets –0.020*  –0.020** 
 (0.053)  (0.027) 
Cash 0.030  0.019 
 (0.112)  (0.248) 
Leverage –0.001  –0.006 
 (0.952)  (0.496) 
Intercept 0.014*  0.014* 
 (0.075)  (0.058) 
Adjusted R² 0.025  0.021 
VIF 1.18  1.20 
Number of observations 819   819 
 
Testing for the price impact of firm characteristics related to the signaling 
undervaluation hypothesis, we obtain mixed results. We find evidence that 
abnormal returns in the announcement window can be related to firm size, 
intangibles-to-assets and pre-event CAR. However, we do not find that the 
market-to-book ratio and the repurchase size have a significant effect on 
abnormal returns. 
From Table 6.3 we observe that the relationship between pre-event CAR 
and event CAR is significantly negative. This result indicates that the worse 
the stock price performance prior to the repurchase transaction, the more 
positive is the market reaction. Firms that experience declining stock prices 
in the period preceding repurchases transactions are more likely to signal 
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undervaluation through repurchases (Ikenberry et al., 2000). Our result is 
consistent with the results of Akyol and Foo (2013), Chan et al. (2004) and 
Zhang (2005). As expected, we observe that on average, the market seems 
to react more positively to repurchase transactions conducted by small firms. 
Our result on firm size is consistent with the findings of Ikenberry et al. 
(1995) and Grullon and Michaely (2002), who find that due to higher infor-
mation asymmetry, small firms can use share repurchases as an effective tool 
to signal to the market that their stock is undervalued. Contrary to our 
expectation, we observe that event CAR decreases with the size of intangible 
assets. This variable is meant to capture the degree of asymmetric infor-
mation between insiders and outsiders regarding the value of the firm’s as-
sets (Marosi & Massoud, 2007). Our result is not consistent with the results 
of Barth and Kasznik (1999), who find that firms with more intangible assets 
experience positive repurchase-announcement returns. 
Initially, we expected that the bigger the repurchase size, the stronger the 
signaling effect. In contrast to our expectations, repurchase size is not sig-
nificant, indicating that the size of the repurchase does not explain any var-
iation in event CAR. The result is consistent with the finding of Zhang 
(2005), who reports that event CAR is not affected by the size of the repur-
chase transaction. Similar to the findings of Andriosopoulos and Lasfer (2013) 
and Ikenberry et al. (1995), we do not find that the market-to-book ratio is 
significantly related to abnormal returns around the announcement window. 
Focusing on firm characteristics related to the agency cost of free cash 
flow, we do not find significance on any of the variables. A plausible 
explanation may be that firms with high cash balance are already 
anticipated by the market to engage in repurchase activity. Our result is 
consistent with the findings of Chan et al. (2004). 
Consistent with Andriosopoulos and Lasfer (2013), leverage does not have 
an impact on abnormal returns, suggesting that share repurchases in Norway 
are not likely to be undertaken to achieve optimal leverage or gain from the 
tax shield benefits. The absence of relationship could be due to the fact that 
repurchases in Norway, were until recently, not allowed to be financed with 
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debt. As a result the potential effect a share repurchase can have on the 
firm’s capital structure is limited. 
Overall, we find some evidence in favor of the signaling undervaluation 
hypothesis; however, the evidence is not persistent across all proxy variables. 
Our results indicate that the price impact of repurchase transactions is neg-
atively related to the size of the firm, the preceding drift in stock price, and 
the intangibles-to-assets ratio. Nevertheless, we do not find evidence that 
the price impact in the announcement window is related to the agency cost 
of free cash flow hypothesis or to the optimal capital structure hypothesis. 
To asses for robustness, we follow Fenn and Liang (2001) and winsorize 
all of the variables in the sample below the 1st percentile and above the 99th 
percentile to see if our results are affected by extreme outliers. The results 
are presented in Table B.4 in Appendix B and remain qualitatively the same. 
 
6.3 Long-term performance of repurchasing firms 
In the previous sections, we found evidence that repurchase transactions 
typically follow after a negative drift in the stock price. In addition, the 
more negative the pre-event drift in stock price, the more positive is the 
market reaction. Our results are seemingly indicative of the signaling under-
valuation hypothesis, and may suggest that managers time their repurchases. 
Obernberger (2014) argues that managerial timing is based on the manager’s 
ability to generate long-term abnormal returns to non-tendering sharehold-
ers. This is consistent with Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), who argue that 
long-term value of share repurchases relies on managers’ ability to exploit 
undervaluation errors. 
If managers possess informational advantage over the market when timing 
repurchases, we should expect wealth redistribution from tendering to non-
tendering shareholders (Barclay & Smith, 1988). However, if repurchases are 
triggered by other motives, such as to provide price support, then we should 
not expect this wealth redistribution. As many former studies show, long-
term performance analysis presents a classical test for assessing the market-
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timing ability of repurchasing managers. 13 If managers’ time repurchases 
based on their private information then according to the semi-strong version 
of market efficiency, stock prices will gradually adjust over time to the ex-
tent that this private information becomes public. In other words, repur-
chasing firms would experience abnormal returns as a consequence of posi-
tive information surprises at a later stage. In this section, we employ both 
BHAR, and calendar-time portfolio approaches discussed in Section 5.2 to 
measure long-term performance of repurchasing firms. Long-term returns are 
analyzed across holding periods of 1, 2, and 3 years. This naturally leads to 
differing event firm sample across the three respective periods, although only 
marginally. 
 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Table 6.4 presents long-term abnormal returns using the BHAR measure 
with monthly returns. Abnormal returns are calculated relative to industry-
matched control portfolios. The industry-matched control portfolios are 
formed based on the industry classification GICS. Each sample firm in the 
portfolio is allocated to a benchmark portfolio based on the same two-digit 
GICS code. In an attempt to improve the robustness of our analysis, we 
initially excluded certain repurchasing firms that are likely to have signifi-
cant impact over their respective benchmark due to their large size. This led 
to the exclusion of Statoil (Oil and Gas), Telenor (Telecommunication), 
Yara (Basic Materials), and DNB (Financials). However, our results, not 
shown here, remain qualitatively the same. 
  
                                      
13 Dann (1981), Ikenberry et al. (1995), Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), among others. 
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Table 6.4 Annual and compounded BHARs 
This table reports monthly BHARs following share repurchases for up to three years. The benchmark 
portfolios are industry-matched control portfolios based on the same two-digit GICS code. Significance 
level is determined via bootstrapping. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A   Annual buy-and-hold returns 
  N 
Repurchase 
firms 
Benchmark 
Portfolio Diff. p-value 
Year 1 146 11.91% 9.70% 2.20% 0.4038 
Year 2 143 8.26% 13.34% –5.07% 0.1768 
Year 3 137 2.03% –0.85% 2.88% 0.4618 
Panel B   Compounded buy-and-hold returns 
  N 
Repurchase 
firms 
Benchmark 
Portfolio Diff. p-value 
Year 1 146 11.91% 9.70% 2.20% 0.4038 
Year 2 143 20.10% 22.49% –2.40% 0.7161 
Year 3 137 15.05% 12.96% 2.09% 0.7500 
 
As highlighted in Section 5.2, the BHAR approach is prone to cross-sec-
tional dependence. To account for this bias, we implement the bootstrapping 
procedure suggested by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999). 14 We assert that this 
adjustment enhances the robustness of BHAR and helps build further con-
fidence in our findings. 
We report the annual as well as the compounded buy-and-hold returns for 
both the repurchasing firms and the benchmark portfolio. While the first-
year annual and compounded buy-and-hold returns are the same, the com-
pounded returns are naturally higher in the second and third year due to 
the effect of annual compounding. As illustrated in Table 6.4, repurchasing 
firms demonstrate superior compounded returns over one- and three-year 
holding periods and inferior performance over a two-year holding period rel-
ative to the benchmark. However, after matching the repurchasing firms’ 
BHARs with the benchmark index, we do not observe any significant differ-
ence in performance of repurchasing firms. For example, the compounded 
BHARs for the repurchasing firms over a three-year holding period are 
                                      
14 The bootstrapping procedure draws 1000 bootstrapped resamples from the original sample of ab-
normal returns and calculates the skewness-adjusted t-statistic using each resample to address the 
cross-correlation and skewness bias 
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15.05% in comparison to 12.96% for the benchmark index; however, the 
difference (2.09%) is statistically insignificant as indicated by the corre-
sponding high p-value. These results imply that repurchasing firms’ long-
term performance does not systematically vary from the benchmark portfolio, 
hence indicating no evidence in favor of abnormal performance. 
 
Calendar-time portfolio approach 
The results based on calendar-time approach are reported under Table 6.5. 
We estimate the long-term performance of repurchasing firms relative to the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model to compute Jensen’s alpha, which in this case measures abnor-
mal performance. As highlighted in Section 5.2, the calendar-time approach 
may suffer from heteroskedasticity. To mitigate this issue, we follow 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000), and employ weighted least 
square (WLS) in addition to standard OLS to estimate abnormal perfor-
mance. 
Table 6.5 reports that calendar time portfolio return series is positively 
related to SMB and the market, and negatively related to HML and MOM 
risk factors. Our results across both OLS and WLS are qualitatively similar 
with the reported alphas being insignificant for all holding periods. Overall, 
our calendar-time portfolio results provide no evidence in favor of abnormal 
performance. 
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Table 6.5 Calendar-time portfolio regressions 
The table presents regressions using the calendar-time portfolio approach. The portfolios are 
rebalanced each month and an equal-weighted excess return is calculated. Alpha measures the average 
monthly abnormal return on portfolios of repurchasing firms. p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Carhart four-factor model 
  
Holding  
period Alpha Market SMB HML MOM Adj. R² Obs. 
OLS 
1-year 0.0139% 0.7527 0.1687 –0.0718 –0.0220 0.7680 2491 
(0.2281) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1388) 
2-year 
0.0136% 0.7445 0.1591 –0.0658 –0.0188 
0.7840 2491 
(0.2175) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1989) 
3-year 
0.0109% 0.7456 0.1657 –0.0564 –0.0053 
0.7986 2491 
(0.2966) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7079) 
         
WLS 
1-year 
0.0099% 0.7450 0.1664 –0.0625 –0.0427 
0.7675 2491 
(0.6909) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0044) 
2-year 
0.0101% 0.7309 0.1499 –0.0462 –0.0480 
0.7827 2491 
(0.6955) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0013) 
3-year 
0.0105% 0.7393 0.1559 –0.0360 –0.0334 
0.7975 2491 
(0.6917) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0075) (0.0185) 
Panel B: Fama–French three-factor model 
  
Holding 
period Alpha Market SMB HML   Adj. R² Obs. 
OLS 
1-year 0.0130% 0.7501 0.1638 –0.0715  0.7677 2491 
(0.2574) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
2-year 
0.0128% 0.7422 0.1549 –0.0656  
0.7837 2491 
(0.2439) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
3-year 
0.0107% 0.7450 0.1645 –0.0564  
0.7986 2491 
(0.3058) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
         
WLS 
1-year 
0.0089% 0.7397 0.1547 –0.0605  
0.7674 2491 
(0.7751) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
2-year 
0.0091% 0.7264 0.1372 –0.0444  
0.7831 2491 
(0.7773) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0009)  
3-year 
0.0103% 0.7371 0.1477 –0.0351  
0.7981 2491 
(0.7425) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0087)  
 
 
Conclusion on long-term performance 
Overall, both BHAR and calendar-time portfolio results indicate that re-
purchasing firms do not experience significant abnormal returns in the long 
run. In other words, we fail to find evidence that managers possess superior 
timing ability. In the event where repurchases were on average driven by 
informational advantage, we would have expected significant positive abnor-
mal returns over the long run. Even if we choose to disregard the high p-
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values, our results carry too low of an economic significance to support man-
agerial timing ability. 
An alternative explanation of our results may be that markets in fact do 
not underreact to information conveyed through repurchase transactions, 
which are generally perceived to be far more credible as opposed to mere 
share repurchase programs that are not binding commitments. In the ab-
sence of under-reaction, stock prices adjust immediately to reflect the fun-
damental value of the firm. Consequently, the firm should not experience 
abnormal returns. However, this logic assumes that the extent of underval-
uation is effectively capped to just the event-day reaction, which in our case 
equates to approximately 0.5%. As Ikenberry et al. (1995) argue, it is im-
plausible that managers would be able to detect such small valuation errors 
and then subsequently act upon them. In other words, 0.5% is not any 
greater than the daily standard deviation of returns for most stocks. Man-
agers plausibly have valuation concerns of greater magnitude when they 
choose to conduct share repurchase with the motive of correcting mispricing. 
The observed tendency of firms to engage in repurchases after a significant 
negative drift in the stock price may initially give the impression of market 
timing. However, the failure to yield subsequent abnormal returns goes 
against the principles of the market timing hypothesis. An alternative ex-
planation put forward by Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) is that repurchases 
are largely driven by price support motives where managers engage in con-
trarian trading preceding a significant negative drift in the stock price. 
In conclusion, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that managers 
do not time the market. Our findings are in accordance with Zhang (2005), 
who finds no evidence for repurchasing firms’ ability to generate long-term 
abnormal outperformance using a matching BHAR approach on his com-
plete sample of repurchasing firms. In another related study, Obernberger 
(2014) arrives at similar findings and concludes that the empirical evidence 
is not in line with the notion of the market timing hypothesis. However, our 
results are inconsistent with the findings of Chan et al. (2007) and Dittmar 
and Field (2015), who find evidence of managerial timing ability.
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7 Conclusion and Further Research 
The purpose of this paper was to contribute to the limited knowledge of 
actual share repurchase activity. Using unique data on daily open market 
repurchases conducted in Norway for the period 2005–2014, we find that 
repurchase transactions are on average preceded by a negative drift in the 
stock price. The average abnormal returns in the announcement window are 
0.54%. Using a cross-sectional regression we find that small firms and pre-
event negative drift in the stock price can explain the abnormal returns in 
the announcement window. These results lend some credence to the signaling 
undervaluation hypothesis stating that managers pursue repurchases when 
they perceive their stock to be undervalued. However, we do not find evi-
dence that repurchasing firms exhibit superior abnormal performance over 
the long run. This result suggests that managers on average do not time the 
market based on informational advantage. Taken together, these results 
have an important implication for the conclusions reached in prior studies 
investigating the long-term abnormal performance of repurchasing firms. 
Finally, we suggest two topics that could further enrich the understanding 
of share repurchases. First, it would be interesting to analyze how insider 
ownership affects repurchase activity. Fried (2005b) argues that the credi-
bility of repurchase as a potential signal of undervaluation may improve 
with increased insider ownership. Therefore, managers with high ownership 
stake have greater incentives to time the market. Second, we think it may 
be of interest to analyze how the manager’s timing ability is affected by the 
firm’s institutional ownership base. Arguably institutional investors are 
informed agents, and would therefore make it difficult for managers to time 
the market. Unfortunately, our limited data sources have constrained our 
ability to incorporate these interesting features, and thus they remain open 
questions to future researchers.
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8 Appendix  
A  Descriptive statistics for cross-sectional regressions 
Table A.1 Descriptive statistics on variables used in the regression models 
Variables Average SD Minimum Maximum 
CAR(–1, +1) 0.0040 0.0450 –0.3722 0.1893 
CAR(0, +1) 0.0037 0.0342 –0.1283 0.1732 
Ln(Size) 8.8103 2.3568 3.6501 13.1973 
Pre-CAR (–10, –2) –0.0079 0.0715 –0.3555 0.3753 
Repurchase Size 0.0027 0.0087 0.0000 0.1000 
Return on assets 0.0685 0.0899 –0.5211 0.4518 
Market-to-book 2.6619 2.6046 0.0600 24.9800 
Intangibles 0.1552 0.1566 0.0000 0.6309 
Cash 0.1169 0.1019 –0.1179 0.4866 
Leverage 0.2203 0.1835 0 0.6988 
 
Table A.2 Definition of variables 
Variables Definition 
Size Natural log of the market capitalization 
Pre-CAR (–10, –2) CARs –10 to –2 days prior to the event 
Repurchase Size Number of share repurchased divided by 
total shares outstanding 
Return on assets Net income divided by total assets 
Market-to-book Market value of equity divided by book 
value of equity 
Intangibles Total intangibles scaled by total assets 
Cash EBITDA less capital expenditures scaled 
by total assets 
Leverage Total debt scaled by total assets 
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B  Robustness check for cross-sectional regressions 
 
Table B.1 Hausman test for random or fixed effects 
ui correlated with regressors, random effect model is appropriate. 
  Coefficients         
Variable Fixed  Random  Difference  S.E. 
Ln(Size) –0.0095  –0.0013  –0.0082  0.0033 
Pre-CAR (–10,–2) –0.0015  0.0040  –0.0055  0.0070 
Repurchase Size –0.0125  –0.1480  0.1355  0.1084 
Return on assets 0.0227  0.0160  0.0067  0.0006 
Market-to-book 0.0011  0.0002  0.0009  0.0075 
Intangibles-to-assets 0.0040  –0.0202  0.0242  0.0187 
Cash 0.0148  0.0615  –0.0467  0.0105 
Leverage –0.0240  –0.0050  –0.0190  0.0168 
        
H0: difference in coefficients not systematic    
Chi2(8) = (b–B)'[(V_b–V_B)^(–1)](b–B) = 12     
Prob > Chi2 = 0.1493               
 
Table B.2 Breusch–Pagan Lagrange multiplier test 
No variance across firms detected. OLS is the appropriate model. 
  Variance   SD  
CAR 0.0012  0.0341 
e 0.0010  0.0314 
u 0.0017  0.0255 
    
H0: Var(u) = 0 across panel entities 
Chibar2(01) = 0.11   
Prob > Chibar2 = 0.3727     
 
Table B.3 Variance inflation factors 
Multicollinearity is not a problem. 
Variables VIF 
Ln(Size) 1.08 
Pre-CAR (–10,–2) 1.03 
Repurchase Size 1.07 
Return on assets 1.48 
Market-to-book 1.03 
Intangibles-to-assets 1.07 
Cash 1.55 
Leverage 1.30 
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To test if the results in Table 6.3 in Section 6.2 are affected by extreme 
outliers, we winsorize all variables in the sample below the 1st percentile and 
above the 99th percentile. Table B.1 illustrates the results from this analysis. 
 
Table B.4 Cross-sectional regression on CARs (winsorized). 
The table reports regressions of CARs from the (–1, +1) and (0, +1) event window on repurchase 
and firm characteristics winsorized at the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile. The sample 
consists of 819 share repurchase trades for the period January 2005 to December 2014. The standard 
errors of the coefficients have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) procedure. p-
values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 CAR (–1, +1)  CAR (0, +1) 
Ln(Size) –0.001*  –0.001* 
 (0.083)  (0.089) 
Pre-CAR (–10,–2) –0.060**  –0.002* 
 (0.033)  (0.091) 
Repurchase Size –0.632  –0.396 
 (0.115)  (0.169) 
Return on assets –0.005  0.012 
 (0.875)  (0.632) 
Market-to-book –0.000  –0.000 
 (0.932)  (0.992) 
Intangibles-to-assets –0.020*  –0.020** 
 (0.055)  (0.027) 
Cash 0.033  0.022 
 (0.136)  (0.214) 
Leverage 0.000  –0.005 
 (0.997)  (0.590) 
Intercept 0.015*  0.012* 
 (0.095)  (0.060) 
Adjusted R² 0.025  0.023 
VIF 1.23  1.25 
Number of observations 819   819 
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